My last day at my FOB was a good summation of my deployment. I had a KLE with the most reputable Afghan official that I worked with, a CID officer in the district my FOB was in. He has successfully investigated a slew of high-profile cases in the province. Our conversation was wide-ranging. I asked about reports that solar panels had been stolen from one of the schools that PRT has constructed -- unfortunately the stealing of solar panels and other resources people don't have in their own homes is relatively common, either for personal use or for re-sale. Then we talked at length about persistent chatter of corruption surrounding the DGOV. Even a casual observer of AFG will not be shocked to hear corruption and GIRoA official in the same sentence. We discussed timber smuggling and his belief that all AUP from the PCoP all the way down were involved. Towards the end, he noted what many in AFG -- Coalition Forces, diplomats, and Afghans alike believe -- "the Talibs are not the problem, this (the corruption) is the problem." And I think long term he is right. The infantry guys I work with get (rightfully) excited when the numbers of INS EKIA are shown during a PPT and especially when we kill/capture a JPEL OBJ -- this is their primary job after all and what they train for. But the leadership, even down to the PL level in many cases knows that CF and ANSF will not kill their way out of this conflict. As with any war, a peaceful resolution is required. And for any government to stand up with any success, it must prove itself to its people -- that it by and large trustworthy and responsive to the needs of its people. That is something that by and large GIRoA has not proven on a wide scale yet.
Another interesting capstone has been reading the reports put out by our HTT that just arrived a few weeks ago. A lot of the reports are pretty predictable for anyone who has spent any time talking with Afghans. My personal favorite was in response to a question about whether CF should leave -- the respondent said "yes, we can take care of ourselves. But you should give us helicopters and factories before leaving." Afghans love helicopters and air support! But it was also telling of what I'll call the "entitlement" syndrome that we probably helped enable with earlier strategies. Afghans are used to aid and projects from CF at this point and the fact that we have gradually turned off the spigot of direct aid in favor of on-budget funding and mentoring GIRoA on the budget process has been challenging. On the individual level it can be frustrating at times constantly being asked for things and thinking of all the lives and billions of dollars that our country has given and will continue to give. But if I didn't have heat during the winter or a reliable water source, I'd probably try to get it wherever I could too.
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